Smallpox attack scenario
Since I already edited a story based on the Dark Winter wargame played in June 2001 at Andrews Air Force Base, I keep noticing references to it in the news. Most summaries don’t convey enough of the story, though. You can find most (but not all) of the relevant documentation online at ANSER Institute for Homeland Security. The model for smallpox spread came from Johns Hopkins, based on previous outbreaks and adjusted for a multi-point terrorist attack today. The study’s key findings are excerpted here, and there’s more in the December issue of Wired (onstand everywhere by November 16th, much earlier in some areas).
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Dark Winter was an exercise designed to simulate possible US reaction to the deliberate introduction of smallpox in three states during the winter of 2002.
EXERCISE LEARNING POINTS
1) An attack on the United States with biological weapons could threaten vital national security interests. Massive civilian casualties, breakdown in essential institutions, violation of democratic processes, civil disorder, loss of confidence in government and reduced US strategic flexibility abroad are among the ways a biological attack might compromise US security.
2) Current organizational structures and capabilities are not well suited for the management of a BW attack. Major ìfault linesî exist between different levels of government (federal, state, and local), between government and the private sector, among different institutions and agencies, and within the public and private sector. These ìdisconnectsî could impede situational awareness and compromise the ability to limit loss of life, suffering, and economic damage.
3) There is no surge capability in the US health care and public health systems, or the pharmaceutical and vaccine industries. This institutionally limited surge capacity could result in hospitals being overwhelmed and becoming inoperable; could impede public health agenciesí analysis of the scope, source and progress of the epidemic, the ability to educate and reassure the public, and the capacity to limit causalities and the spread of disease.
4) Dealing with the media will be a major, immediate challenge for all levels of government. Information management and communication (e.g., dealing with the press effectively, communication with citizens, maintaining the information flows necessary for command and control at all institutional levels) will be a critical element in crisis/consequence management.
5) Should a contagious bioweapon pathogen be used, containing the spread of disease will present significant ethical, political, cultural, operational and legal challenges.